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<title>Review of Finance - current issue</title>
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<prism:eIssn>1573-692X</prism:eIssn>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/iii?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Editorial Statistics]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/iii?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pagano, M., Zechner, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfn019</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Editorial Statistics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>iii</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>iii</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Editorial Statistics</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/433?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Equity Portfolio Diversification]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/433?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This study shows that U.S. individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios, where the level of under-diversification is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence, trend-following behavior, and local bias. Furthermore, investors who over-weight stocks with higher volatility and higher skewness are less diversified. In contrast, there is little evidence that portfolio size or transaction costs constrains diversification. Under-diversification is costly to most investors, but a small subset of investors under-diversify because of superior information.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Goetzmann, W. N., Kumar, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfn005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Equity Portfolio Diversification]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>463</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>433</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/465?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Are Economists More Likely to Hold Stocks?]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/465?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Using a large panel data set containing detailed information on educational attainments as well as financial and socioeconomic variables for individual investors, we show that economists are more likely to hold stocks than otherwise identical investors. First, we consider the change in stockholdings associated with (<I>i</I>) completing an economics education and (<I>ii</I>) an economist moving into the household. Second, we model stock market participation using a probit model with unobserved individual heterogeneity. Third, instrumental variables estimation allows us to identify the causal effect of an economics education on stock market participation. Throughout, we focus explicitly on the effect of a <I>change</I> in educational status on the likelihood of holding stocks.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christiansen, C., Joensen, J. S., Rangvid, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfm026</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Are Economists More Likely to Hold Stocks?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>496</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>465</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/497?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Informed Traders as Liquidity Providers: Anonymity, Liquidity and Price Formation]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/497?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The tendency to introduce anonymity into financial markets apparently runs counter to the theory supporting transparency. This paper studies the impact of pre-trade transparency on liquidity in a market where risk-averse traders accommodate the liquidity demand of noise traders. When some risk-averse investors become informed, an adverse selection problem ensues for the others, making them reluctant to supply liquidity. Hence the disclosure of traders' identities improves liquidity by mitigating adverse selection. However, informed investors are effective liquidity suppliers, as their adverse selection and inventory costs are minimized. With endogenous information acquisition, transparency reduces the number of informed investors, thus decreasing liquidity. The type of information that traders hold and the effectiveness of insider trading regulation are crucial to distinguish between equilibria.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rindi, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfm023</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Informed Traders as Liquidity Providers: Anonymity, Liquidity and Price Formation]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>532</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>497</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/533?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Suppressed Negative Information and Future Underperformance]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/533?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I present evidence of inefficient information processing in equity markets by documenting that negative information withheld by securities analysts is incorporated in stock prices with a significant delay. I estimate the extent of the withheld negative information based on the proportion of analysts who stop revising their annual earnings forecasts. This measure predicts negative earnings surprises and negative price reaction around earnings announcements. It could also be used to generate profitable trading strategies. I show that institutions tend to sell their stock holdings as my measure of unreported negative news increases, thus ameliorating the mispricing.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Scherbina, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfm028</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Suppressed Negative Information and Future Underperformance]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>565</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>533</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/567?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Priming the Risk Attitudes of Professionals in Financial Decision Making]]></title>
<link>http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/12/3/567?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We explore the influence of priming on financial decisions by reinforcing subjects' risk-seeking behavior under uncertainty and comparing it to behavior in control groups. We focused on professionals: commercial banks' investment advisors and accountants in CPA firms. Results indicate that priming affects subjects' risk attitudes and investment decisions. Professionals' decisions were affected more than undergraduates', suggesting they employ a more intuitive and less analytic approach in making their decisions. Our work is related to field-data research documenting correlations between returns (investors' decisions) and situational factors, (i.e., weather) by suggesting controlled tests of professionals' behavior vis-a-vis the complexity inherent in field data.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gilad, D., Kliger, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/rof/rfm034</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Priming the Risk Attitudes of Professionals in Financial Decision Making]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>European Finance Association</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>586</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>567</prism:startingPage>
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